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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellant Smith's Food a n d Drug is from
a final order of t h e Labor Commission of U t a h d a t e d M a r c h 16, 2 0 0 9 . This
Court h a s jurisdiction over this appeal p u r s u a n t to U t a h Code Annotated
§§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 6 3 G - 4 - 4 0 3 , a n d 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2009).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did t h e Labor Commission correctly d e t e r m i n e t h a t Ms.

C h r i s t e n s e n ' s claim of injury to h e r neck, t h a t occurred gradually over time
from J u l y or A u g u s t 2 0 0 1 to November 20, 2 0 0 1 , s h o u l d be evaluated a s
a cumulative t r a u m a "accident" r a t h e r t h a n a s a n "occupational disease"?
S t a n d a r d of Review. In Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2 0 0 0 UT 47, 396
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, the Court articulated the proper s t a n d a r d of review for
administrative proceedings. It stated:
m a t t e r s of s t a t u t o r y construction are q u e s t i o n s of law, reviewed
for correctness. . . . An exception to this general rule exists if
the legislature h a s either explicitly or implicitly granted
discretion to the agency. However, a b s e n t a g r a n t of discretion,
a n agency's interpretation or application of a s t a t u t o r y term
should be reviewed u n d e r the correction of error s t a n d a r d .
Id. at f f 13-14; see also

LPI Services

v. Labor Commission,

2 0 0 7 UT App

375, 173 P.3d 8 5 8 . Appellants s u b m i t t h a t a correction of error s t a n d a r d
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applies as the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted and applied the
applicable statutes and law in this action.
This issue was preserved at R. 147-195.

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2001), of the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act provides:
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever
such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposefully selfinflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury . . . the amount provided for in this
chapter for . . . medical, nurse, and hospital services and
medicines, . . . provided for under this chapter.

Id. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103.
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable
occupational
disease means any disease or illness that arises out of and in
the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated
by that employment.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question whether the Utah Labor
Commission correctly determined that a worker's claim of injury to her
neck, that occurred gradually over time from July or August 2001 to
November 20, 2001, should be evaluated as a cumulative trauma
"accident", rather than as an, "occupational disease" (with the provisions
of the Utah Occupational Disease Act applicable).
Such distinction between whether Ms. Christensen's work events
qualify as an industrial accident versus an occupational disease is
relevant due to the apportionment provisions for non-industrial
conditions available under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. See Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2009).
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts
Ms. Christensen began working for Smith's Food & Drug ("Smith's)
in its dairy around November 16, 1993 . (R., 189). Ms. Christensen
filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits due to work
accidents while working for Smith's as a cheese cook.
In the first Application for Hearing, Ms. Christensen claims that
she sustained a neck injury on February 1, 2001, while pulling a cart
4
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which handle broke. (R., 2). In the second Application for Hearing, Ms.
Christensen claims that she was involved in an industrial accident by
"cumulative work trauma," again involving her neck, that arose on
November 20, 2001, as a result of stirring, lifting and carrying a large vat
of cottage cheese while employed by Smith's over the course of several
months. (R., 23, 42).
Ms. Christensen also filed a third Application for Hearing for an
occupational disease claim due to an injury to her neck from 1994 to
2002 from lifting, reaching, and squeezing objects, but later withdrew
that Application for Hearing at the evidentiary hearing. (R., 35, R., 172).
Evidence was presented at the hearing from Aspen Ridge Physical
Therapy noting that Ms. Christensen feels that the type of work she does
has a cumulative effect, leading to the medical problems she is now
having. Doctors note that Ms. Christensen had this particular job at
Smith's for 8 V2 years and notes that Ms. Christensen described her work
as involving a lot of lifting, reaching and squeezing bags of fruit and
repeating this function for ten to thirteen hour shifts. (R., 42; R., 1
Medical Exhibit, 43).
On November 20, 2003, this case came on for hearing before the
Utah Labor Commission. Judge Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law
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Judge, presided at the hearing. At the hearing, Ms. Christensen denied
that she sustained any specific injury on November 20, 2001, but rather
classified her neck condition as one that occurred over time with
symptoms commencing in July or August 2001. (R., 191; 134). Ms.
Christensen also testified that she had neck and shoulder pain dating
back to 1995, prior to her employment at Smith's.

(R., 189, 192) . Ms.

Christensen further testified that she began working for Smith's around
1993 as a trainer in the dairy department which job duties entailed
repetitive job assignments. (R., 189).
On J u n e 2, 2004, the Labor Commission issued Findings of Fact
and Interim Order. (R., 59-65).
On J u n e 24, 2004, the Labor Commission referred this case to the
medical panel. Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis was appointed the chairperson for
the medical panel. (R., 67-68).
On February 23, 2005, the medical panel issued a report.

(R., 7 1 -

73).
On March 18, 2005, Ms. Christensen filed her objection to the
medical panel report. (R., 77-94).
On March 3 1 , 2005, Smith's filed a Response to Ms. Christensen's
Objection to the medical panel report. (R., 77-94).
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On August 3 1 , 2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its
report. (R., 115-116).
On September 8, 2005, the medical panel issued a supplemental
report. (R., 117-119).
On December 29, 2005, the medical panel was asked to provide
further clarifications. (R., 124-25).
On J a n u a r y 11, 2006, the medical panel issued a second
supplemental report. The medical panel ultimately found that 60% of
Ms* Christensen's cervical spine condition was not work-related. (R.,
126-128).
On J u n e 29, 2006, ALJ Lorrie Lima issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. (R., 131-145). The ALJ found that
approximately three to four months prior to November 2001, Ms.
Christensen experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work.
(R., 134). Based upon the panel's revised opinion, the ALJ found that
Ms. Christensen's cervical condition was aggravated by cumulative work
trauma that arose in November 2001 and awarded full worker's
compensation benefits, without apportionment to pre-existing medical
conditions. See id. The ALJ also found that no benefits were owed to
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Ms. Christensen as a result of any work event on February 1, 2001. See
idL
On July 26, 2006, Smith's filed a Motion for Review arguing that
Ms. Christensen's claim should be classified as a occupational disease
and benefits should, therefore, be apportioned according to the Utah
Occupational Disease Act.

(R., 146-196). Additionally, Smith's argued

that apportionment principles should equally apply under the Utah
Worker's Compensation Act, otherwise an unfair windfall of benefits
would inure to the benefit of Ms. Christensen, and also would treat
occupational diseases differently from industrial accidents.
On March 16, 2009, the Labor Commission entered an Order
Affirming ALJ's Decision. (R., 208-211). The Commission held that Ms.
Christensen's claim is properly classified as a cumulative trauma injury
- or "accident" - by November 20, 2001. Therefore, the Commission held
that the case was properly evaluated under the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act rather than the Utah Occupational Disease Act. No
substantial analysis was provided by the Labor Commission regarding
why Ms. Christensen's work event should be classified as an industrial
accident. See id.
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Smith's h a s since filed a Petition for Review of the Order Affirming
ALJ's Decision.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is undisputed that Ms. Christensen suffered from a pre-existing
deterioration of her cervical spine which was separate and not solely
caused by her work activities for Smith's. Under Ms. Christensen's
cumulative trauma theory, the ALJ and Commission have correctly
awarded to Ms. Christensen full compensation for all of her medical
expenses and indemnity benefits despite the medical panel finding that
60% of her cervical spine problem is not work related. For the Labor
Commission to order Smith's to pay for all of Ms. Christensen's medical
expenses and indemnity compensation without any apportionment for
her pre-existing degenerative cervical spine condition, allows Ms.
Christensen to reap a windfall and results in an unfair decision in favor
of Ms. Christensen and against Smith's.

Ms. Christensen should not be

allowed to enjoy the benefit of full compensation for payment of her
medical expenses and indemnity benefits at the expense of Smith's when
her cervical spine condition is more related to non-industrial factors than
any work related activity which aggravated her medical condition.
Under a cumulative trauma accident theory, Ms. Christensen's
claim for workers' compensation benefits should fail because 60% of Ms.

10
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Christensen's cervical spine problems were not caused by work related
activities or conditions. To hold otherwise would suggest that an injured
worker could prevail on a cumulative trauma accident theory even if only
a nominal percentage- 1% - of the worker's medical problems were
determined to be work related.

Utah's Workers' Compensation Act was

never designed to produce such a result.
Under the theory of a cumulative trauma accident claim, Ms.
Christensen is entitled to either 100% compensation for payment of all
medical expenses a n d / o r indemnity benefits, or she is not entitled to
receive any compensation. For this reason, it makes sense that Ms.
Christensen's cumulative trauma claim should be classified as an
occupational disease claim which then allows the Labor Commission to
apportion compensation, according to the medical panel's report, and
which takes into consideration both the non-industrial and industrial
factors that caused or contributed to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine
condition. To apportion the medical cause of Ms. Christensen's condition
between industrial and non-industrial factors is fair to both parties, and
if applied under an occupational disease theory, results in an equitable
result consistent with the medical panel report and Utah's Occupational
Disease Act

11
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ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MS.
CHRISTENSEN'S NOVEMBER 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 CUMULATIVE TRAUMA
CLAIM SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
RATHER THAN AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE.

In her Application for Hearing, Ms. Christensen raised a worker's
compensation claim under the theory of a cumulative trauma industrial
accident, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 et seq., with an
onset date of November 20, 2001. At hearing, Ms. Christensen clarified
that her cumulative trauma accident allegedly resulted from her work
activities of stirring, lifting and carrying large vats of cheese while
working as a cheese cook for Smith's in July or August, 2001 through
November 20, 2001. (R., 191-92). l
Contrary to the Commission's ruling, Ms. Christensen's claim
should be classified as an occupational disease and not a cumulative
trauma accident. The import of this is evident when reviewing the
provisions of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act versus that of the
Utah Occupational Disease Act ("ODA"). For claims filed under Utah's
1

Ms. Christensen also raised an additional claim under the theory
of an occupational disease for work exposure from 1994 through 2002.
This occupational disease claim most appropriately fits the facts of this
case, because of the long-term repetitive nature of the Ms. Christensen's
work for Smith's, but Ms. Christensen withdrew her occupational disease
claim at the evidentiary hearing.
12
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ODA, apportionment of medical and indemnity benefits is available
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 for non-industrial conditions. By
contrast, subject to the exception for permanent partial disability, Utah's
WCA does not provide for apportionment for non-industrial conditions.
Given that the panel opined that 60% of Ms. Christensen's neck
condition is non-industrial, it is important for the court to determine if
Ms. Christensen's claim is one that is classified as an occupational
disease or an industrial accident, and to better clarify these statutes.
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code (Worker's Compensation Act)
provides:
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment,
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not
purposefully self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for
loss sustained on account of the injury . . . the amount
provided for in this chapter for . . . medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, . . . provided for under this
chapter.

Id. (Emphasis added). The term, "accident" is not defined by statute.
By contrast, section 34A-3-103 of the Utah Code provides:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable
occupational
disease means any disease or illness that arises out of and in
the course of employment and is medically caused or
aggravated by that employment.
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. The term, "disease or illness* is not
defined by statute,
Utah's appellate courts have attempted to distinguish between the
term "accident" and "occupational disease" as used in these statutes. In
Carling v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), the Court held:
The Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 35-1-45,
U.C.A. 1953, provides for an award to an employee "* * * who
is injured * * * by accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment * * *." There is no further definition of the
term "accident," but this court has held that for the purpose
of the Act it should be given a broad meaning, n l It connotes
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of
events. n2 We recognize the correctness of plaintiffs
contention that even though there must be some such
"accident" within the meaning of that statute, n 3 this is not
necessarily restricted to some single incident which happened
suddenly at one particular time and does not preclude the
possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive
cause, a climax might be reached in such manner as to
properly fall within the definition of an accident as just stated
above. n4 However, such an occurrence must be
distinguished from gradually developing conditions which
are classified as occupational diseases and which are not
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2 of Title 35
(Sections 35-2-1, et seq.), U.C.A. 1953.

Carling v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 260, 261-262 (Utah 1965); see
also Kaiser Steel Corp. V. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).
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In Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 23 P.2d 930 (Utah 1933),
the Court held:
The word, "accident" refers to the cause of the injury, and it is
here used in its ordinary and popular sense, as denoting an
unlooked mishap, or an untoward event, which is not
expected or designed by the workman himself, as a
physiological injury as a result of the work he is engaged in,
an unusual effect of a known cause, a casualty. It implies
that there was an external act or occurrence which caused
the injury or death. It contemplates an event not within one's
foresight and expectation resulting in a mishap causing injury
to the employee.' [1 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, 274]
* * * Where there is any attempt to define the meaning of the
word 'accident,' as used in compensation acts, the cases cited
by plaintiffs are generally in accord with the definition given
by Honnold. What is termed an accident must be something
out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to
time and place. If the injury is incurred gradually in the
course of the employment, and because thereof, and there
is no specific event or occurrence known as the starting
point, it is held to be an occupational disease, and not an
injury resulting from accident. Such, in the opinion of the
[***15] writer, is the rule, well sustained by both reason and
authority, and is not seriously controverted by any wellconsidered case cited by either of the parties in the instant case."
HN5 An occupational disease has been defined [**934] as
"a diseased condition arising gradually from the character
of the employee's work, but it is not an 'accident,"' and an
accident "is distinguished from an occupational disease,
in that it arises by some definite event, the date of which
can be fixed with certainty, but which cannot be so fixed
in the case of occupational disease. Wilson & Co. v. McGee
(Okl. Sup.) 21 P . 2 d 2 5 , 27.
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Thompson v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 247, 255 (Utah 1933). 2

Ms. Christensen did not sustain an industrial accident at work. At
the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Christensen denied that she sustained any
specific injury to her neck, shoulder, arms or h a n d s on either November
20, 2001, 3 or on November 16, 2001, 4 or on November 10, 2001. 5 Ms.
Christensen testified at the hearing as follows:
Q. Did you recall an exact injury event on November 20 that
involved your neck?
A. No.
2

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 169 at 566-68.
"Occupational disease is [1] a disease caused by, or especially incident
to, or the natural consequences of, the particular employment in which
the workman is engaged, [2] that the disease arises out of and in the
course of the employment, [3] that the disease is one which is caused by
the workman's exposure, in the ordinary course of employment, to
hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary living or
ordinary occupations, [4] that it develops gradually, [5] as a result of
following a certain occupation or employment, in its ususal and ordinary
course, [6] for a considerable period of time, and [7] that it is a disease
which human foresight and science and industry, have not learned to
fend against or eliminate. 7 '
3

The date of the alleged accident as plead by Ms. Christensen on
the Application for Hearing.
4

The date Ms. Christensen returned to the Tanner Clinic for
treatment with Dr. J a y Yates for left upper extremity pain- MRE, 005.
5

The date Ms. Christensen began to feel left upper extremity pain
as reported to Dr. Yates on November 16, 2001.
16
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Q. Do you recall an injury event on November 16, 2001 that
involved your neck?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall an exact injury event six days earlier on
November 10 th that would have involved your neck?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall an injury event on either the 20 th , the 16th, or
the 10 th of November that would have involved your shoulders?
A. No.
(See R., 191, Hearing Transcript page 82).

Ms. Christensen also testified that she began to feel a slow and
gradual onset of shoulder a n d / o r neck symptoms in approximately July
or August 2001. (R., 191-192). Ms. Christensen first noticed shoulder
pain while driving her car - not while performing a work activity. (R.,
191). Ms. Christensen's shoulder pain would come and go depending
upon her activity level. Ms. Christensen testified at the hearing as
follows:
Q. Let me ask you this, is it fair to say then that the pain in
your neck developed over
time?

A. I started feeling an onset of pain months before November
20.
17
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Q. Not years?
A. No, not for numbness in my shoulder (inadudible).
Q. Pain in your neck of any type, when did your first feel an
onset of neck pain?
A. (Inaudible) I didn't.
Q. Can you determined when your first felt an onset of
shoulder pain?
A. Probably three to four months before I went to see Dr.
Yeates is when it started. But it would go away.
Q. So that would have been sometime in July or August of
2001?
A. Yes.
Q. And you'd feel shoulder pain where?
A. In the roundness of my shoulder.
Q. You're referring to your left shoulder, right at the socket?
A. Yeah, I would notice it mainly driving down the road when
I would go to put my arm up on the window.
Q. When you were driving your car?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you testified that it would go away?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it would come back again?
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A. Yes, depending on what I was doing.
{See R., 191, Hearing Transcript pages 83-84).
Ms. Christensen had also treated for a r m / h a n d pain, numbness,
neck and right shoulder pain with Dr. Bennet as far back as May of
1995. 6 However, Ms. Christensen claims that the pain she felt while
treating with Dr. Bennet could be distinguished from the type of pain she
experienced when she began to treat with Dr. Yates in November 2001. 7
Ms. Christensen further testified that her shoulder and neck pain
gradually intensified over time until she sought treatment from Dr. Yates
on November 16, 2001. 8 At this time, Ms. Christensen had been
employed by Smith's for eight years. She worked as trainer. She was
required to train new employees on the diary department equipment and
fill-in when employees went on vacation or called in sick. 9 She was

6

See R l , Medical Record Exhibit pages 8-12. On May 9, 1995, Ms.
Christensen reported her major complaints to be a r m / h a n d
p a i n / n u m b n e s s / n e c k pain. Neck and right shoulder - can't turn or move
neck movement severe pain - pain into the arm starting today.
7

See R., 192, hearing transcript page 85.

"See R., 191-192, hearing transcript page 83-85; R l , Medical
Records Exhibit page 007.
9

See R., 173, Hearing Transcript page 11.
19
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required to perform repetitive work activities for Smith's for several
years.
Ms. Christensen's cumulative trauma accident claim should be
more appropriately classified as an occupational disease claim. There
was no sudden, unexpected or unintended occurrence that either caused
or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine in November
2001. See Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729, P.2d 15, 22-23 (Utah
1986). Ms. Christensen's claim for benefits is clearly based upon
repetitive work activities that resulted in a gradually developing cervical
spine condition that at the very least developed over several months, and
for which she first began to receive medical treatment as far back at
1995. Indeed, following the strictures of Utah case law, the claim should
be classified as an occupational disease since it gradually occurred over
time, because there is no specific event or occurrence known as the
starting point, and due to the fact that it is a disease that is greater for
those in this occupation than for those in ordinary occupations.
Thompson v. Industrial Comm% 82 Utah 247, 255 (Utah 1933).
The ALJ and Commission both incorrectly concluded that Ms.
Christensen's claim should be classified as an accident and not as an
occupational disease, ''because the period of time in which she [Ms.
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Christensen] experienced shoulder pain was short until the pain evolved
into chronic pain thereafter." The ALJ further concluded that Ms.
Christensen's cumulative trauma was, "distinguishable from an
occupational disease which typically evolves over a period of several
months or years." (See R., 141, Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order pages 10-11).
Ms. Christensen's shoulder and neck pain did evolve over a period
of months, and more likely years as she had treated for similar neck and
shoulder symptoms with her chiropractor dating back to 1995. In
addition, Ms. Christensen's neck/shoulder pain developed from her
repetitive work activities and not from a specific work accident or injury.
Ms. Christensen's job as a trainer required her to perform repetitive work
activities, and she regularly performed such work activities for Smith's
for several years.
The facts of this case dictate that Ms. Christensen's claims should
have been classified and adjudicated as an occupational disease claim
regardless of the title assigned to the claim by Ms. Christensen.

See

Allen at 18, citing Carting v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (Utah
1965) (A claim may be classified as an occupational disease claim if the
underlying medical complaint is a "gradually developing condition."). See
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also A.A. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Labor Commission case no. 99-0776,
(date 1/31/01) (Where the worker's claim is based upon a gradually
developing condition, the Labor Commission concludes that the claim
must be adjudicated according to the provisions of the Utah Occupational
Disease Act). See R., 161.
Similar to the repetitive work performed by the worker in Icon, Ms.
Christensen's cumulative trauma accident claim involved repetitive work
activities of stirring, lifting, and carrying large vats of cheese each day
over several years. Her medical condition gradually worsened over time
until her neck/shoulder pain prompted her to receive medical care.
There was no specific accident or injury event sustained by Ms.
Christensen to her cervical spine. Consequently, Ms. Christensen's
cumulative trauma claim should be adjudicated according to Utah's
Occupational Disease Act.
The medical panel's effort to apportion the medical cause of Ms.
Christensen's cervical spine condition between non-industrial and work
related factors is appropriate under Section 34A-3-101, Utah Code Ann.,
and Rule R602-2-2(l), Utah Administrative Code. To hold otherwise in
this case will set a precedence that eliminates Utah's Occupational
Disease Act from application in cases where the injured worker does not
22
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sustain a specific and identifiable work related injury, and the worker's
complaints of pain from repetitive work activities are slow and gradual
over a significant length of time. Such a ruling was not intended by our
state legislature when Utah's Occupational Disease Act was enacted.
According to the medical panel, Ms. Christensen's work activity for
Smith's merely contributed to the pre-existing deterioration of Ms.
Christensen's cervical spine. The medical panel considered that there
were both industrial and non-industrial components to Ms. Christensen's
cervical spine condition. Many factors contributed to the occurrence of
Ms. Christensen's spine condition, including her genetic disposition to
such a condition, smoking, nutrition and physical load and stress on the
spine of both an industrial and non-industrial nature. In fact, the
medical panel concludes that absent the non-industrial factors, Ms.
Christensen likely would not have developed cervical spine problems,
even if she had experienced the several years of industrial exposure as
outlined in the Findings of Fact. 10
Utah's Occupational Disease Act allows for the payment of worker's
compensation benefits for a work-related aggravation of a non-work

10

See medical panel report dated September 8, 2005 answer to
question no.l, page 1.
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related illness or disease. Section 34A-3-103, Utah Code Ann., includes
aggravation as part of the definition of a compensable occupational
disease. Also, Section 34A-3-110(4), Utah Code Ann., provides for the
apportionment of both medical and indemnity compensation when a
disability (deterioration of the cervical or lumbar spine), which is not
itself compensable, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way
contributed by an occupational exposure. Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah
Labor Commission, 2009 UT 19, 208 P.3d 533 (Utah 2009) (holding that
the term "compensation" includes medical expenses in apportionment
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110); Temmie K. Murphy v. City Market,
Labor Commission case no. 01-0827, (date 4 / 1 5 / 0 4 ) .
In the City Market case, the Labor Commission ordered the
employer/carrier to pay for 40% of the worker's medical expenses of her
non-industrial cervical spondylosis which was aggravated by her work
conditions under an extension of occupational disease coverage. In City
Market, the Labor Commission cited Larson's Workers'

Compensation

Law, Section 52.06(3) which addresses the aggravation of a pre-existing
weakness as an occupational disease and not as an accident.
states in pertinent part as follows:
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Larson's

Closely related to the question of preexisting allergy is
that of preexisting weakness, disease, or susceptibility.
Although there is some contra authority, most courts treat
this problem the same as that of allergies, and hold that
when distinctive employment hazards act upon these
preexisting conditions to produce a disabling disease, the
result is an occupational disease.
(See Larson's at Section 52.06(3); emphasis added).
In this case, Ms. Christensen's cumulative trauma accident claim
should be classified as an occupational disease claim. Ms. Christensen's
repetitive work aggravated her non-industrial cervical spine problems.
The facts of this case support an occupational disease claim and not a
cumulative trauma accident claim. Smith's requests that the Court of
Appeals reverse the Commission's holding and conclude that Ms.
Christensen's claim should be classified as an occupational disease. Ms.
Christensen's worker's compensation claims, which include both medical
expenses and an award for indemnity benefits should then be
apportioned under Utah Code Ann. 34A-3-110.

Smith's should be

ordered to pay for no more than 40% of Ms. Christensen's claim for
indemnity benefits and medical expenses consistent with the medical
panel report.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth herein, Smith's requests that
the Court of Appeals reverse the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision dated March 16, 2009, and hold that the Occupational Disease
Act applies to Ms. Christensen's claim for workers' compensation
benefits. This Court should overturn that part of the Labor
Commission's Order and apportion the liability for Ms. Christensen's
claims between both the non-industrial (60%) and industrial (40%)
causes of Ms. Christensen's cervical spine condition.
Respectfully submitted this / *

day of March, 2010.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Bret A. Gardner
Kristy L. Bertelsen
Attorneys for Appellants, Smith's Food
& Drug

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing document
were mailed, first class, postage prepaid on the / £*^ day of March,
2010, to:

U t a h C o u r t of A p p e a l s

(8 copies, one w / original signature)

Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Alan L. Hennebold, General Counsel
Labor Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 1466
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

(1 copy)

Richard Burke
7390 South Creek Rd. #104
Sandy, UT 84093

(2 copies)

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Telephone: 801-530-6800
GINA CHRISTENSEN,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG,
Respondent.

Case Nos. 2002948, 2002949, 2002436
Judge Lorrie Lima

HEARING:

November 20,2003,160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The hearing
was pursuant to Order and Noticed of the Utah Labor Commission.

BEFORE:

Debbie Hann, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Gina Christensen, was present and represented by Richard
R. Burke, Esq.
The respondent, Smith's Food & Drug, was represented by Bret Gardner,
Esq.
STATEMENT OF CASE

c

Case Number 2002436 - February 1, 2001, Date of Injury
On April 23,2002, Gina Christensen (Petitioner)filedan Application for Hearing and alleged
entitlement to medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation and
interest resulting from a February 1, 2001, industrial accident when she hit her neck. On May 7,
2002, the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative
Proceedings and Order for Answer. On June 5,2002, Smith's Food & Drug (Respondent) filed an
Answer and denied Petitioner was injured as alleged because the accident was never reported. It
further denied that Petitioner was injured by accident as she alleged.
At the hearing, Respondent did not pursue the lack of notice defense based upon
Petitioner's written report of the accident on the day it occurred to Respondent. Respondent denied
the accident was the medical cause of Petitioner's cervical spine condition.
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Case Number 2002948 - November 20, 2001, Date of Injury
On August 27, 2002, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing and alleged entitlement to
medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial
compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and interest resulting from a
November 20,2001, cumulative trauma accident due to Petitioner's work activities of stirring, lifting
and carrying large vats of cottage cheese. On September 18, 2002, the Commission issued a
Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for Answer. On October 18, 2002,
Respondent filed an Answer and denied that Petitioner was injured as alleged because she never
reported an accident, cumulative trauma or otherwise. Respondent further denied that Petitioner
was injured by accident as alleged.
At the hearing, Respondent did not pursue the lack of notice defense. Respondent denied
the accident was the medical cause of Petitioner's cervical spine condition.
Case Number 2002949 - Occupational Disease period of exposure 1994, through 2002.
On August 27, 2002, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing and alleged entitlement to
medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation and interest resulting
from an industrial exposure due to repetitive lifting, reaching and squeezing over the period 1994,
through 2002, resulting in a neck condition. On September 18, 2002, the Commission issued,a
Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for Answer. On October 18, 2002,
Respondent filed an answer and denied the claim because Petitioner failed to timely report an
occupational disease. It denied Petitioner's condition was the result of an occupational exposure.
At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew the occupational disease claim and the parties agreed the
case should be dismissed.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On June 2, 2004, a Findings of Fact & Interim Order was issued by Judge Hann. On
June 24, 2004, the medical issues were referred to a Commission medical panel. On February
24, 2005, the medical panel filed its report. On February 24, 2005, a copy of the medical panel
report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to file an
objection.
On August 31, 2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its medical panel report. On
September 8, 2005, the medical panel filed a supplemental report. On September 9, 2005, a
copy of the report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to
respond.
On December 29,2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its medical panel report.
On January 11, 2005, the medical panel filed a supplemental report. On January 12, 2006, a
copy of the report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to
respond.
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OBJECTION TO MEDICAL PANEL REPORT
Section 34A-2-601(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Workers Compensation Act outlines the
objection process. Any objection filed under this provision is to the entry of the medical panel
report into the record. However, the preponderance of the evidence must still be considered in
reaching the final determination. Thus, the objection does not go to the weight the report should
be given but to its admission into the record.
On March 8, 2005, an Order was issued to allow the parties to file any objection to the
medical panel report by March 18, 2005. Petitioner filed a timely objection on March 18, 2005.
On April 4, 2005, Respondent filed an untimely response.
On September 23, 2005, Respondent filed an untimely objection to the medical panel
supplemental report. On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed an untimely response.
Petitioner argued that apportionment of a permanent impairment to a preexisting
condition is appropriate where there is demonstrated evidence of cervical problems which predate the industrial injury. Petitioner asserted that the only evidence presented as a prior injury or
limitation was Petitioner's industrial incident on February 1, 2001, which the medical panel
determined was not medically connected to her cervical condition. Petitioner further argued that
medical expenses cannot be apportioned in industrial accident/cumulative trauma cases.
Based on the foregoing, there is nothing within Petitioner's objection that would
prevent the medical panel report from being entered into the evidentiary record. The medical
panel conducted a comprehensive review of the history and development of Petitioner's medical
condition. The panel had access to Petitioner's compete medical history as well as an
opportunity to personally examine her. With that information the panel performed the function
requested of it - the impartial application of the panel's medical knowledge, experience and
judgment to the circumstances of Petitioner's case. Accordingly, the medical panel report is
admitted into the record, and any facts found by the medical panel not in conflict with the
Findings of Fact are admitted into the record pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(2)(d).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Employment and Compensation.

Petitioner was employed in Respondent's dairy for approximately eight years. In 2001,
Petitioner's job was to train new hires on how to make cultured dairy products and to fill in for dairy
workers who were on vacation. The parties stipulated that on February 1,2001, Petitioner's weekly
compensation rate was $408.00 and on November 20, 2001, it was $421.00.
2.

Industrial Injuries and Medical Treatment.
A.

February 1,2001.

On February 1, 2001, Petitioner was changing a roll of shrink wrap on the shrink wrap
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machine. The machine was about 6 feet tall, 4.5 feet wide and 15-16 feet long. Petitioner was
bending over with her legs bent to lift out the empty roll of shrink wrap by pulling on a handle. As
she lifted the handle, it broke partly loose when a bolt holding it sheared, causing her to stumble
backward about 2 to 2.5 feet and hit the back of her neck on an electrical box attached to the wall
that stuck out about 2 to 2.5 feet. The blow to Petitioner's neck was across her neck as she hit the
edge of the box causing her head to go forward. Petitioner's arms went numb, a sensation she
described as similar to hitting one's "funny bone" and she lost feeling in her index finger and thumb.
The numbness went away in about 30-45 seconds. About two hours later, Petitioner's neck became
stiff. Petitioner reported the injury that day and filled out a report (Exhibit P-1). Petitioner left her shift
a couple of hours early and then returned to work the next week after resting over the weekend.
She did not miss any further work.
B.

November 20,2001.

In November 2001, Petitioner's job duties were as a cheese cook where milk was converted
to cheese curd in eight large vats holding 350,000 pounds of milk that were about 25 to 40 feet long
and 4.5 feet wide with the top edge of the vat at Petitioner's shoulder level. Petitioner and a
coworker worked the shift in this area of the dairy. The vats were filled with milk from an overhead
line that Petitioner attached to the vat. Petitioner pushed a button to begin filling. Once the vat was
filled with milk and starter, it sat for 3 to 3.5 hours. During this time, Petitioner filled the other vats.
Petitioner and her coworker lifted two stainless steel screens with wire used as cutters, one at a
time, and attached them to an overhead mechanism above the vat. This required Petitioner to reach
both arms out straight in front of her. Then, Petitioner attached a cross cut knife to an overhead
mechanism and Petitioner and her coworker pushed and pulled it back and forth across the width of
the vat at shoulder height for the vat's entire length through the cheese, making about 8 cuts per vat.
Next, Petitioner and her coworker pulled the knives out of the vat and inserted a 6 foot heater that
weighed about 5 to10 pounds into the cheese. Following this step, Petitioner and coworker inserted
6 foot stainless steel paddles on a shaft that weighed 50 to 60 pounds to an overhead mechanism
above the vat. This was performed at shoulder level with Petitioner's arms outstretched. There were
2 paddles per tank and it was not uncommon to have to make more than one attempt to hook the
paddle to the mechanism. After the heating/paddle process was complete, Petitioner and her
coworker removed the paddles and placed them in the next vat ready for the same process. After
removing the paddles, Petitioner and her coworker attached two pushers that weighed about 65 to
70 pounds to the same overhead mechanism, used for the paddles, and utilized the same
movements. The pushers and paddles were lifted by Petitioner. The pushers pushed the cheese
from the vat into a pipe. Once the vat was empty, Petitioner and coworker cleaned the vat by
standing at the side, which is about armpit level, and reached over using a brush with a 5 to 6 foot
handle to scrub the bottom and both sides of the vat. Then, Petitioner and her coworker rinsed the
vat.
Two employees worked in the vat room on 12 hour shifts and 8 vats were used on each shift
so there were no empty vats. Petitioner took two 15 minute breaks and a 30 to 45 minute lunch
break.
Approximately three to four months before November 2001, Petitioner experienced shoulder
pain that was exacerbated by work but it always resolved. In November 2001, Petitioner
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experienced stiffness and soreness in her shoulder. Petitioner testified that the pain she
experienced at that time was different from the intermittent pain that she felt a few months earlier.
On approximately November 10,2001, Petitioner experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder
pain. She experienced intermittent numbness in her index finger and thumb.
On November 16, 2001, Petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Yates at the Tanner Clinic for
complaints of shoulder pain for the past six days. The x-rays of Petitioner's shoulder were
unremarkable but cervical spine x-rays revealed spondylosis consistent with degenerative disc
disease. Dr. Tanner referred Petitioner to physical therapy at Aspen Ridge. Medical exhibit 5.
Petitioner began physical therapy on November 19,2001. The physical therapist noted "...she is not
sure how she injured her neck but does a lot of lifting at work." Medical exhibit 23-28.
When Petitioner asked for a light duty assignment, Respondent sent her to WorkMed for
evaluation on November 20, 2001. Petitioner was evaluated for neck pain following lifting at work
and she was assessed with left cervical nerve impingement at C6-7. The physician's first report of
injury noted that a work causal relationship was undetermined. Medical exhibit 45.
Dr. Yates referred the petitioner to Dr. MacFarlane for further evaluation. On January 7,
2002, a cervical MRI showed that Petitioner had a C6-7 disc herniation, disc abnormality at C5-6
and disc herniation at C4-5. Dr. MacFarlane recommended possible surgery. Medical exhibit 5051. On January 28, 2002, Petitioner returned with pain after increasing her activity level. Surgery
was scheduled for February 28, 2002. Medical exhibit 53.
On February 25, 2002, Dr. Shepherd performed an independent medical evaluation of
Petitioner at Respondent's request. Dr. Shepherd found no medical causal relationship between
Petitioner's work activities and the three level disc involvement. He noted that Petitioner had a preexisting upper extremity parasthesias and, although her work might have aggravated the condition, it
was not the cause. Medical exhibit 64.
On February 28,2002, Dr. MacFarlane performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion
and C4-C7. Medical exhibit 95. In a March 1,2002 letter, Dr. MacFarlane states "Ms. Christensen
was well prior to a work related injury of November 20, 2001..." and during the surgery, "...we did
indeed find acute disc herniations at those levels. There was evidence of acute damage to the
posterior longitude and the ligament with subsequent disc herniation causing compression
centrally..." As a result, Dr. MacFarlane was of the opinion that Petitioner suffered an acute event as
the result of a work injury. Medical exhibit 54.
On June 5, 2002, Dr. MacFarlane noted Petitioner's neck and arm pain had completely
resolved. Medical exhibit 59. Petitioner was given light duty work when she was initially released to
light duty on May 9, 2002.
Petitioner was again evaluated by Dr. Shepherd on June 18, 2003, and he assigned an
impairment rating of 23% whole person to Petitioner's condition although he did not believe there
existed a medical causal connection between a work injury and her condition. Medical exhibit 74.
Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Dall who opined the most significant incident was the
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February 1,2001, injury when she struck her head on the electrical box based upon her description
of bilateral upper extremity parasthesias. Dr. Dall assigned an impairment rating of 17% whole
person impairment as the result of this injury and he noted the remaining problems Petitioner
experienced were a cascade from the February 2001, injury. Medical exhibit 78-87.
Petitioner was again evaluated by Dr. Shepherd on October 3,2003, who opined there was
no medical causal connection between Petitioner's cervical disc herniations and the February 10,
2001, injury because the symptoms she had pre-dated that injury. Dr. Shepherd also noted that Dr.
Dall was not given all the medical records as part of his evaluation, and he pointed specifically to the
chiropractic records where Petitioner had reported numbness in her arms and hand prior to either
injury. Medical exhibit 76-77.
3.

Prior Medical Treatment.

Prior to 2001, Petitioner received chiropractic treatment for neck pain along with arm and
hand numbness. On May 9,1995, Petitioner sought treatment at Bennett Chiropractic and reported
that she could not turn or move her neck without severe pain and she had pain in her arm.
Petitioner underwent a course of treatment through June 1995. Medical exhibit 8-12. Petitioner
also underwent a course of chiropractic treatment with Dr. Kunzler beginning July 20, 2000, for
headache, neck pain, upper back pain and low back pain. Petitioner also reported arm numbness,
left more than right. Medical exhibit 18-20. In a January 17, 2002 letter, Dr. Kunzler noted that
when he examined Petitioner and took x-rays, there did not appear to be any disc problems and
Petitioner's condition at that time was not severe. Medical exhibit 22.
On June 27,1989, Petitioner had a cervical spine x-ray due to a hyperextension injury to her
neck. Medical exhibit 88. Petitioner slipped in her shower and struck the right side of her head and
reported increasing pain radiating up into her head and down into her right shoulder on October 19,
1992. The physician at Tanner Clinic observed no tenderness along Petitioner's cervical spine and
she had normal neck range of motion although she experienced tenderness over the right occiput
and down into the paraspinious muscles. Medical exhibit 2. Petitioner also had a mass in her neck
removed in 1997. Medical exhibit 89-90.
4.

Medical Panel Report and Supplements.

The medical panel consisted of Drs. Joseph Jarvis, Chairman, and Dennis Gordon,
orthopedic surgeon. The medical panel examined Petitioner on August 5, 2004, and reviewed
her medical and diagnostic records.
A.

February 1,2001.

The medical panel opined that there was no medical nexus between Petitioner's current
medical condition and her industrial accident on February 1, 2001. The medical panel noted that
cervical disc pathology was generally considered a consequence of chronic deterioration due to
multiple factors including genetic predisposition, nutrition and physical load or stress on the
spine. The medical panel further noted that a single event, such as Petitioner experienced on
February 1, 2001, was unlikely to be the sole proximate or substantial cause of her cervical disc
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rupture. The medical panel observed that following Petitioner's industrial accident, her
symptoms resolved quickly and she resumed her regular work duties for eight months.
B.

November 20,2001.

The medical panel opined there was a medical nexus between Petitioner's current
medical condition and her cumulative work injury on November 20, 2001. The medical panel
noted there was published evidence that repetitive lifting and stress to the upper extremities
performed by Petitioner at Respondent's facility would have contributed or aggravated
deterioration of her cervical spine. The medical panel further noted that Petitioner's x-rays of
November 2001, showed narrowing of the C6-7 disc space with cervical spondylosis which
required an extended period of time to develop.
The medical panel further opined that other non-industrial factors may have contributed
to Petitioner's cervical disc disease in addition to her work. The medical panel noted that
medical literature is replete with evidence that other non-industrial factors (both inherited and
acquired) would have been necessary for the development of Petitioner's condition. Therefore,
the medical panel further noted, that absent the non-industrial factors, Petitioner would not have
developed cervical spine problems even with the performance of her work activities. The
medical panel concluded that Petitioner's repeated lifting and other work activities aggravated
the preexisting non-industrial conditions which led to her symptoms and diagnosis of cervical
pathology after November 2001.
The medical opined that Petitioner was medically stable on June 5, 2002, based on Dr.
MacFarlane's note that Petitioner's neck and arm pain had completely resolved. The medical
panel assessed an impairment rating of 17% percent whole person due to Petitioner's three
level cervical disc excision and fusion. The medical panel apportioned 60% of the impairment
rating to Petitioner's preexisting condition and 40% to industrial factors.
The medical panel opined that the medical care Petitioner received related to her
cumulative trauma injury on November 1, 2001, was as follows: Dr. Yates evaluation in
November 2001, including radiography, physical therapy at Aspen Ridge, WorkMed evaluation
in November 2001, Dr. MacFarlane's evaluation in January 2002, including a MRI, Petitioner's
cervical discectomy and fusion in February 2002, and follow-up care through June 2002.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Workers Compensation Act requires employers and their
insurance carriers to pay disability benefits and medical expenses for employees who suffer
accidental injuries "arising out of and in the course" of their employment. An injury "arises out of
employment when the employment is both the legal and medical cause of the injury." Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In this case, Respondent questioned whether
Petitioner has satisfied the requirements of medical causation. However, before addressing the
issue of medical causation, the issue of legal causation is analyzed.
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1.

Legal Causation.

In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), the Court
explained the requirements of legal causation as follows:
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with the
employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from
a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment activity involved
some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life."
The Court in Allen developed an objective standard of comparison to evaluate typical
non-employment activities performed by today's society. Typical activities and exertions
included taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on a car, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing stairs.
Before a higher legal causation standard applies, an employer must prove medically that
the claimant suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to the injury. Nyrehn v.
Industrial Commission etai, 800 p.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1990).
A.

Preexisting Condition.

The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr.
Shepherd, demonstrates that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to
her cervical condition. The medical panel observed that the narrowing of Petitioner's C6-7 disc
space with cervical spondylosis required an extended period of time to develop. Dr. Shepherd
noted that Petitioner had a preexisting upper extremity parasthesias.
B.

Higher Legal Causation Standard.

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's work activities as a cheese cook
in November 2001, during a 12 hour shift included the following: (1) repeat lifting/connecting
lines and screen cutters over eight filled vats that were as tall as Petitioner's shoulders, (2)
push/pull a knife back and forth (with Petitioner on one side of a vat and a coworker on the other
side) across the width of each vat (4.5 wide) at shoulder height, (3) insert a six foot heater into
each vat and insert two six foot paddles onto a shaft, weight between 50 to 60 pounds, onto an
overhead mechanism above each vat r Petitioner performed this work activity by herself at
shoulder level with arms outstretched, (4) remove the paddles and insert two pushers, weight
between 65-70 pounds, to the overhead mechanism - Petitioner performed this work activity by
herself with the same movements as the paddles (the pushers pushed the cheese into a pipe),
and (5) clean each vat's sides and bottom with a five to six foot handle with attached brush
standing at armpit level and reaching over the side. Petitioner and a coworker rinsed each vat.1
1 Based on the medical panel report, Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, was not the cause of her
medical condition. See Medical Causation under Discussion and Conclusions of Law. Therefore, whether
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The preponderance of evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's aggregate exertion,
during a 12 hour shift of multiple days, of repetitive lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and
cleaning either overhead or back and forth at Petitioner's shoulder level and the repetitive lifting
overhead, in tandem with a coworker, of tools that weighed up to 70 pounds, exceeded the
typical nonemployment life activities identified in Allen. For example, typical nonemployment lift
activities and exertions would include taking full garbage cans to a street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on a car or lifting a small child to chest height. However,
Petitioner performed the same work activities as described above repeatedly over eight vats that
were as high as her shoulders during her work shift and over a period of approximately four
months.
In Nyhren, the court held that the employee's cumulative lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to
36 times daily over a period of time caused unusual and extraordinary wear and tear on her body
when compared to the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life as discussed in
Allen. In the present matter, Petitioner's lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and cleaning of items
at shoulder height or overhead may not be considered unusual when performed periodically.
However, Petitioner performed the same repeat work activities, multiplied by several vats, during
a 12 hour work shift over a period of time. Accordingly, Petitioner's employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk she faced in everyday life because of her preexisting
condition.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's work activities met the higher legal causation
requirement under Allen.
2.

Medical Causation.

The significance of medical causation and the importance of medical panels in
evaluating medical causation was discussed in Allen.
The purpose of the medical cause test is to ensure that there is a medically
demonstrable causal link between the work-related exertions and the
unexpected injuries that resulted from those strains.
The purpose of medical panels was discussed in Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
With the issue being one primarily of causation, the importance of the . . .
medical panel becomes manifest. It is through the expertise of the medical
panel that the Commission should be able to make the determination of
whether the injury sustained a claimant is causally connected to or
contributed to by the claimant's employment.

Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, met the higher legal causation standard is not analyzed in this
section.
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A.

Industrial Accident-February 1,2001.

The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr.
Shepherd, demonstrates that there was no medical causal relationship between Petitioner's
industrial accident on February 1, 2001. The medical panel opined that cervical disc pathology
was generally considered a consequence of chronic deterioration due to multiple factors such as
genetic disposition, smoking, nutrition and physical load or stress on the spine. The medical
panel further opined that Petitioner's work activity on February 1, 2001, would not be the sole,
proximate or substantial cause of her cervical disc rupture. Moreover, Petitioner's symptoms
resolved quickly and Petitioner worked regular duty for eight months. Dr. Shepherd opined that
Petitioner's symptoms pre-dated her industrial accident.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, did not
cause her cervical condition.
B.

Cumulative Trauma Injury - November 20,2001.

The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinion of the medical panel,
demonstrates that Petitioner sustained a cumulative trauma work injury on November 20,2001.
The medical panel opined that Petitioner's repetitive lifting and stress to her upper extremities
contributed to or aggravated deterioration of her cervical spine.2 The medical panel observed
that the narrowing of Petitioner's C6-7 disc space with cervical spondylosis would have required
an extended period of time to develop.
The medical panel further opined that other non-industrial factors may have contributed
to Petitioner's cervical disc disease in addition to her work. The medical panel noted that
medical literature is replete with evidence that other non-industrial factors (both inherited and
acquired) would have been necessary for the development of Petitioner's condition. Therefore,
the medical panel further noted, that absent the non-industrial factors, Petitioner would not have
developed cervical spine problems even with the performance of her work activities. The
medical panel concluded that Petitioner's repeated lifting and other work activities aggravated
the preexisting non-industrial conditions which led to her symptoms and diagnosis of cervical
pathology after November 2001.
Petitioner's work situation was similar to the facts in Nyhren as discussed above. In
Nyhren, the injured worker lifted tubs multiple times daily and experienced pain over a period of
time. In this matter, Petitioner experienced periodic shoulder pain, which resolved, for
approximately three months. In November 2001, Petitioner began to experience constant pain
that was different than the intermittent pain she felt earlier and which caused her to seek medical
attention. The period of time in which she experienced periodic shoulder pain was short until the

2 It is noteworthy that Dr. Shepherd opined that, although she had a preexisting upper extremity paresthesias, her
work may have aggravated her condition - it was not the cause of her condition.
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pain evolved into chronic pain thereafter. Therefore, Petitionees claim of cumulative trauma is
distinguishable from an occupational disease claim which typically evolves over a period of
several months or years.
The medical panel assessed an impairment rating of 17% to Petitioner's cervical
condition. And, although it apportioned 60% of the rating to non-industrial factors and 40% to
industrial, the medical panel apportioned the impairment rating under the occupational disease
theory and not an industrial accident theory. As Petitioner's claim was based on an industrial
accident/cumulative trauma theory3, apportionment of an impairment rating would only be
appropriate when there was objective medical documentation that a prior ratable impairment
existed before the industrial accident in the same anatomical area. See Utah's 2002 Impairment
Guides.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's cervical condition was permanently aggravated by
her work activities.
3.

Temporary Total and Partial Disability Compensation.

Sections 34A-2-410 and 411of the Workers Compensation Act govern temporary total
and partial disability compensation.
Temporary total and partial disability compensation benefits are payable until the
healing period has ended and the injured worker's condition has stabilized. "Stabilization means
that the period of healing has ended and the condition of the claimant will not materially improve.
Once healing has ended, the permanent nature of the claimant's disability can be assessed and
benefits awarded accordingly." Booms v. Rapp Construction Co., 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986).
The preponderance of evidence demonstrates that Petitioner was temporarily and totally
disabled from her cervical condition based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr.
MacFarlane from February 28, 2002, to May 9, 2002. Although the medical panel concurred
with Dr. MacFarlane that Petitioner was medically stable on June 5, 2002, Petitioner returned to
work light duty at Respondent's facility on May 9, 2002.
Petitioner did not present any evidence that Petitioner was entitled to temporary partial
disability compensation.
Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410 and Booms,
Petitioner was entitled to temporary total disability from February 28, 2002, the day of her

3 it would be improper for this administrative forum to sua sponte change the theory of Petitioner's claim from
cumulative trauma/industrial accident to occupational disease. See Hilton Hotel and Reliance Insurance v.
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 897 P. 2d. 352 (Ct of App. 1995).
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surgery, to May 9, 2002, when she returned to work. Petitioner was not entitled to temporary
partial disability compensation.
4.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

_.

Section 34A-2-412 of the Workers Compensation Act provides for permanent partial
disability compensation based upon the medical evidence.
The preponderance of the evidence, based on the opinion of the medical panel,
demonstrates that Petitioner's cervical condition has an impairment rating of 17% whole person.4
Although Dr. Shepherd assigned an impairment rating of 23% to Petitioner's condition, he opined
that there was no medical nexus between her condition and work injury. Accordingly, the medical
panel's assessment of 17% whole person to Petitioner's condition was the most detailed and careful
analysis. Although, the medical panel apportioned 60% of Petitioner's impairment rating to nonindustrial factors and 40% to industrial factors, apportionment can only be calculated where there is
objective medical documentation that a prior ratable impairment existed before the industrial
accident for the same anatomical area. The only evidence presented regarding Petitioner's prior
injuries or limitations was the industrial accident on February 1,2001, and the medical panel did not
find a causal nexus between Petitioner's cervical condition and that incident. Accordingly, as no
prior impairment that existed prior to the cumulative trauma injury of November 20, 2001, was
identified, apportionment of Petitioner's permanent impairment rating is not appropriate.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was entitled to an impairment rating of 17% whole person
due to her cumulative trauma injury of November 20, 2001.
5.

Medical Expenses and Recommended Medical Care.

The preponderance of evidence, based upon the opinions of the medical panel and Dr.
MacFarlane, demonstrates that the medical care Petitioner received for her cervical condition
since November 2001, was necessary. Both the medical panel and Dr. MacFarlane found a
medical causal connection between Petitioner's cumulative trauma accident on November 20,
2001, and her need for surgery on February 28, 2002. The medical panel specifically
determined that the medical treatment Petitioner received as follows was necessary to treat her
condition: (1) Dr. Yates evaluation in November 2001, including radiography, and Petitioner's
physical therapy, (2) Dr. MacFarlane's evaluation in January 2002, and Petitioner's MRI scan,
and (3) Petitioner's cervical discectomy and fusion in February 2002, and follow-up care through
June 2002.
The parties did not present any evidence in dispute that was related to the future medical
care of Petitioner's cervical condition.
4 Dr. Dall also assessed an impairment rating of 17% whole person to Petitioner's condition, however, he opined that
the February 1,2001, industrial accident caused her condition which had a cascade effect.
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Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was entitled to medical expenses, beginning on or
about November 16, 2001, due to her cumulative trauma accident on November 20, 2001, as
specified on her Application for Hearing. Medical expenses cannot be apportioned out as
Petitioner's claim is based on a cumulative trauma/industrial injury theory.
6.

Travel Expenses.
Petitioner did not present any evidence of travel expenses.
ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner temporary total
disability compensation at the weekly rate of $421.00 from or 10.1 weeks, for a total of
$4,252.10. The amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum plus interest at eight
percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner permanent partial
disability compensation at the weekly rate of $369.00 for a permanent impairment rating of
seventeen percent (17%) whole person, or 53.04 weeks, for a total of $19,571.76. The amount is
accrued, due and payable in a lump sum at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the statutory attorneys1 fees of
$4,723.58, plus 20% percent of the interest awarded herein, directly to Richard Burke, Esq.,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That
amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Burke.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay all medical expenses, including
any out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Petitioner, reasonably related to her cumulative trauma
injury of November 20, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-418(1), and the medical and
surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum, under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-213,
and travel allowances hereinafter incurred pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's claim for recommended medical care is
dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's claim for temporary partial disability
compensation and travel expenses are dismissed with prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 2002436 is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 2002949 is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED THIS 29th day of June, 2006.
UTAH LABOR COmMSSlOH

LorrieHrfma^^
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis
for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on June 29, 2006, to the persons/parties
at the following addresses:
Richard Burke Esq
7390 S Creek Road #104
Sandy UT 84093
Bret Gardner Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

GINA CHRISTENSEN,
Petitioner,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG,

j

Case No. 02-0436,02-0948
and 02-0949

Respondent.

Smith's Food & Drug ("Smiths") asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative
Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Gina Christensen under the Utah) Workers' Compensation
Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 63G-4-301 and § 34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Ms. Christensen claims workers' compensation benefits from Smiths for a work accident that
occurred on February 1, 2001, and cumulative work trauma that arose by November 20, 2001,
thereby injuring her cervical spine. Following the evidentiary hearing, a medical panel was
appointed to review the medical aspects of the case. Based on the panel's opinion, Judge Lima
found that Ms. Christensen's cervical condition was aggravated by cumulative work trauma that
arose in November 2001, and awarded benefits.
In its motion for review, Smiths argues that Ms. Christensen's claim should be classified as
an occupational disease claim and benefits should therefore be apportioned according to the Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge Lima's findings of facts. Those facts relevant to the issue in
the motion for review can be summarized as follows:
Ms. Christensen has a history of a preexisting cervical condition dating back to 1989. Ms.
Christensen worked in Smith's dairy department for eight years. Around July or August, Ms.
Christensen was experiencing shoulder pain that was exacerbated from her work duties but always
resolved. In November 2001, Ms. Christensen was working as a cheese cooker in the dairy. This
position required her and another coworker to work together during a 12-hour shift to cook the milk
down into cheese curds. Hie milk was cooked in eight large vats, using large and heavy equipment
(60-70 pounds) that had to be hooked above the vats to stir, cut, and push the finished cheese out of
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the vat. During the time period she was performing these duties, Ms. Christensen experienced
stiffness and soreness in her shoulder that was different than the intermittent pain she previously had
felt. On November 16,2001, she sought medical treatment and x-rays of the cervical spine revealed
spondylosis consistent with degenerative disc disease. A cervical MRI confirmed she has suffered a
C6-7 disc herniation, disc abnormality at C5-6 and disc herniation at C4-5.
Ms. Christensen's doctor, Dr. MacFarlane, performed surgery and observed finding acute
disc herniations in the cervical spine at various levels. In Dr. MacFarlane's opinion, Ms. Christensen
suffered an acute event caused by a work injury. Smiths' medical consultant, Dr. Shepherd,
disagreed and found no medical causation between Ms. Christensen's work activities and her
cervical disc condition. Based on these conflicting opinions, a medical panel was appointed.
The medical panel, consisting of a doctor specializing in occupational and environmental
health and an orthopedic surgeon, reviewed the medical records and examined Ms. Christensen. The
panel agreed with Dr. MacFarlane's assessment and found that the cumulative work trauma that
appeared by November 20,2001, medically caused an aggravation to Ms. Christensen's preexisting
cervical condition.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Under § 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, in order to recover benefits,
Ms. Christensen must prove that she was injured "by accident out of and in the course o f her
employment. Smith's argues that Ms. Christensen did not suffer an accident compensable under the
workers' compensation act, but rather, over time had developed a cervical disease condition that
should be compensated under the Utah Occupational Disease Act.
Although Ms. Christensen had previously reported some shoulder stiffness and pain, as of
November 20,2001, Ms. Christensen was reporting the development of new shoulder pain unlike her
previous complaints. At the time of this new development, she was repeatedly lifting and connecting
lines and heavy screen cutters, paddles, and pushers over eight large vats, and then later, was
cleaning the large vats, all during a 12-hour shift. Dr. MacFarlane treated Ms. Christensen and
during surgery, noted acute disc herniations that, in his opinion, showed Ms. Christensen had
suffered an acute injury from her work. The medical panel agreed with Dr. MacFarlane's opinion
that there had been an acute event that occurred at work to cause Ms. Christensen's condition.
The Commission is convinced that due to the repetitive and unusual and extraordinary
exertion required of Ms. Christensen in performing her duties as a cheese cook, she suffered a
cumulative trauma injury—or "accident"—by November 20, 2001, which arose out of and in the
course of her employment. Therefore, the Commission finds that benefits are appropriately awarded
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. As this claim is a claim for workers' compensation
benefits, there is no need to address whether apportionment might be appropriated under the
Occupational Disease Act.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nn9HQ

ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ'S DECISION
GINA CHRISTENSEN
PAGE 3 OF 4
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Lima's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this / ^ d a y of March, 2009.

Sherri^Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Gina
Christensen, Case Nos. 02-0436,02-0948 and 02-0949, was mailed first class postage prepaid this
J^Zay of March, 2009, to the following:
Gina Christensen
1967 W 2175 S
Syracuse UT 84075
Smith's
500 N Sugar St
LaytonUT 84041
Richard Burke, Esq.
7390 S Creek Rd #104
Sandy UT 84093
Bret Gardner, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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